田水承, 赵雪萍, 黄欣, 李停军, 李广利. 基于进化博弈论的矿工不安全行为干预研究[J]. 煤矿安全, 2013, 44(8): 231-234.
    引用本文: 田水承, 赵雪萍, 黄欣, 李停军, 李广利. 基于进化博弈论的矿工不安全行为干预研究[J]. 煤矿安全, 2013, 44(8): 231-234.
    TIAN Shui-cheng, ZHAO Xue-ping, HUANG Xin, LI Ting-jun, LI Guang-li. Research on Miner Unsafe Behavior Intervention Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Safety in Coal Mines, 2013, 44(8): 231-234.
    Citation: TIAN Shui-cheng, ZHAO Xue-ping, HUANG Xin, LI Ting-jun, LI Guang-li. Research on Miner Unsafe Behavior Intervention Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Safety in Coal Mines, 2013, 44(8): 231-234.

    基于进化博弈论的矿工不安全行为干预研究

    Research on Miner Unsafe Behavior Intervention Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

    • 摘要: 基于进化博弈理论,构建了“矿工-安全监管者”和“矿工-矿工”之间的博弈模型,通过对模型的求解和分析,为煤矿企业控制矿工的不安全行为,从而减少由不安全行为导致的人因事故,同时对应该注意的几方面工作进行分析探讨。

       

      Abstract: Based on the evolutionary game theory, it built the game models of miners and safety supervisors as well as miners and miners. Through the calculation and analysis of the model, it provided some guidance for controlling unsafe behavior of miners in coal mines and reduced the accidents due to unsafe behavior factors. At the same time, it discussed several aspects which should be noted in work.

       

    /

    返回文章
    返回