杨雪, 田阳, 仝凤鸣. 基于进化博弈的矿工情绪监管与不安全行为研究[J]. 煤矿安全, 2018, 49(8): 299-302.
    引用本文: 杨雪, 田阳, 仝凤鸣. 基于进化博弈的矿工情绪监管与不安全行为研究[J]. 煤矿安全, 2018, 49(8): 299-302.
    YANG Xue, TIAN Yang, TONG Fengming. Research on Miners’ Emotional Supervision and Unsafe Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Safety in Coal Mines, 2018, 49(8): 299-302.
    Citation: YANG Xue, TIAN Yang, TONG Fengming. Research on Miners’ Emotional Supervision and Unsafe Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Safety in Coal Mines, 2018, 49(8): 299-302.

    基于进化博弈的矿工情绪监管与不安全行为研究

    Research on Miners’ Emotional Supervision and Unsafe Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game

    • 摘要: 针对矿工情绪可能导致不安全行为的问题,以进化博弈论为基础,构建了“矿工情绪监管 - 矿工不安全行为”的博弈模型,对模型的求解和分析结果表明,情绪对矿工不安全行为的潜在风险值、矿工情绪监管者对矿工情绪疏导的成本、矿工的安全作业成本分别与矿工不安全行为呈正向关系,矿工因情绪导致不安全行为的成本、发生安全事故后矿工所需承担的损失值分别与矿工不安全行为成负向关系。提出了通过人为干预的方式来提高煤矿对矿工情绪监管的效率和减少矿工因情绪导致不安全行为的对策。

       

      Abstract: For the problem that Miner’s mood may lead to unsafe behavior, a game model of “miner emotion supervision and miner’s unsafe behavior” was constructed based on the theory of evolutionary game theory. The solution and analysis results of the model showed that the potential risk value of emotion to the unsafe behaviors of miners, the cost of emotional adjustment for miners from supervisor and the cost of safe operation of miners are positively correlated with the unsafe behaviors of miners; the cost of unsafe behaviors caused by miners’ emotion and the loss value that they should bear after safety accidents are negatively correlated with the unsafe behaviors of miners. This paper proposes some measures to improve the efficiency of coal mine emotional regulation and reduce the unsafe behaviors of coal mine by means of human intervention.

       

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